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Would “Hamsterdam” Work? Drug
Depenalization in The Wire and in Real Life
John Bronsteen†

ABSTRACT
The television show The Wire depicts a plan called “Hamsterdam” in which police
let people sell drugs in isolated places, and only those places, without fear of arrest.
Based on limited but decent empirical evidence, we can make educated guesses
about what would happen if that were tried in real life. Indeed, Swiss police tried
something remarkably similar in the 1980s. More generally, the results of various
forms of drug legalization, depenalization, and decriminalization in Europe—
such as in Portugal, which has transferred the state’s method of dealing with drug
use (including heroin and cocaine) from the criminal justice system to a civil administrative system since 2001—shed light on the likely strengths and weaknesses
of Hamsterdam-like efforts. The Wire seems to get a lot right, including some of
Hamsterdam’s successes and Hamsterdam’s political unsustainability. Unfortunately, The Wire might actually understate how hard it would be, even if there
were no political impediments, to make sweeping improvements in real-world drug
policy via Hamsterdam-like efforts.

INTRODUCTION
Drugs have been a core concern of American law for at least the
past half-century.1 During that time, drug use and the “war on drugs”
have played central roles in the politics, culture, and public policy of
this nation, as well as in the daily lives of millions of its people.
Still, millions of others are fortunate enough not to have been affected directly by drugs or the drug war.2 If neither they nor their close
†

Georgia Reithal Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
I will use the word “drugs” in this Article as a shorthand for illicit drugs like heroin, cocaine,
and usually marijuana—as distinguished from therapeutic drugs like ibuprofen (when those therapeutic drugs are used legally) or legal recreational drugs like alcohol and tobacco.
2
In particular, I have in mind “hard drugs” like cocaine and heroin. The points I make in this
Article relate to marijuana as well, and indeed the arguments for more lenient policies are stronger
in the case of marijuana because its effects are less harmful. Moreover, recent state-level legalization policies in the United States should ultimately create fertile ground for study of how best to
deal with that drug. Unfortunately, those efforts are so recent that it is too early to study their
effects meaningfully, so they are not my focus here.
1
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friends or relatives use drugs, much less are addicted to drugs, then
they may not have given much thought to the issue. Those people often
vote in elections or otherwise participate in the civic life of their community, so their understanding of the drug issue matters.
At least some of those people surely had their awareness raised by
the television show The Wire.3 Although The Wire was far from the most
popular show of its day, it has nonetheless been viewed by millions of
people, and is perhaps the most critically acclaimed show of all time.4
The Wire depicts the war on drugs in Baltimore, Maryland in a manner
that is, at once, relentlessly realistic and thrillingly dramatic.
The Wire unflinchingly depicts the violence and tragedy associated
with drugs in Baltimore. The clear implication is that our nation’s drug
policies are failing. They are contributing to, or at a minimum are not
preventing, both widespread drug addiction and violence.
About halfway through the show’s five seasons, the show goes beyond that implication and makes the point explicit. It does so by introducing a character named Bunny Colvin, a police commander who tries
to improve upon the status quo by choosing not to enforce drug laws in
certain areas of Baltimore that come to be known as “Hamsterdam.”
This strategy, albeit not a panacea, works strikingly well in the fictional world of The Wire. It reduces violence and improves life in areas
of Baltimore that were previously ravaged by rival drug gangs. But as
is so common in The Wire, Colvin’s idealistic vision ultimately fails due
to others’ ignorance and narrow self-interest. Politicians portray Colvin’s effort negatively for political gain, and this leads to the end of
Hamsterdam and the return of violence to the streets.
It is hard to watch The Wire without wondering whether Colvin’s
idealistic vision could work in real life, especially if somehow the political will could be summoned to pursue it. Is The Wire right that a carefully crafted scheme of depenalization—i.e., non-enforcement of the
drug laws—could dramatically reduce violence without greatly increasing drug use?

3

Lance McMillian, Drug Markets, Fringe Markets, and the Lessons of Hamsterdam, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849, 857 (2012) (“The Wire resonates for so many because it authentically
exposes middle-class, white-collar observers to a world completely foreign to them.”); see also C.W.
Marshall & Tiffany Potter, “I Am the American Dream”: Modern Urban Tragedy and the Borders
of Fiction, in THE WIRE: URBAN DECAY AND AMERICAN TELEVISION 1, 9 (C.W. Marshall & Tiffany
Potter eds., 2009) (“HBO is a subscriber-based channel, and the bulk of its audience is composed
of (comparatively) affluent, middle-class, white Americans. . . . Many would not have previously
invested emotional energies in caring about the drug problem in urban America and its ramifications.”).
4
See, e.g., McMillian, supra note 3, at 851 (“The Wire is the greatest television series of alltime.”).
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In this Article, I will take up that question. In Part I, I will discuss
the treatment of this issue in The Wire and will briefly note the significance of fiction for real-world understandings of law and policy. In Part
II, I will discuss how certain countries other than the United States—
namely, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Portugal—have tried to
combat drug problems via policies that fall in between legalization and
zero-tolerance. I will discuss the lessons we can learn from those other
countries’ experiences and assess whether Hamsterdam or alternative
efforts would likely be successful.
I.

THE WIRE

My point of departure will be The Wire itself. I will first briefly discuss why fiction can be valuable for thinking about law and policy, and
then sketch out the show’s treatment of drug depenalization.
A.

Why Fiction?

Fictional stories—whether they are in books, movies, TV shows, or
other forms—often serve the purpose of entertainment. In that vein,
they are like crossword puzzles, board games, or anything else that is
intended solely or primarily to be consumed for enjoyment.
But fictional stories can also be much more than that. They can
teach us things about our own lives and the lives of others, and they can
raise our awareness of issues we had overlooked. In many cases, such
stories might even be the most effective way of educating the public
about law and policy. For one thing, people may be more willing to devote their time to fictional stories than to sources of non-fictional information due to the stories’ drama and excitement. And for another thing,
stories inherently teach lessons effectively because they show how law
and policy play out in real life, under circumstances that are at least
somewhat relatable.5
This is especially valuable when the fiction’s creators have spent
years educating themselves about the reality they are depicting. The
Wire is not a documentary, but it is nonetheless the product of careful
study of the drug trade and the drug war on the streets of Baltimore.6

5

McMillian, supra note 3, at 852–53 (“Stories are powerful teaching tools because they marry
information (knowledge) and context (application). By observing how the power of law affects characters whom they have come to know and care about, viewers move beyond the four corners of
theory to the more dynamic and affecting experience of seeing law play out in a way that is personally meaningful to them. Through this humanizing process of putting a name and a face on
complex legal problems, film and television force a greater contemplation of the potential effects
of legal decisions in the real world. . . .”).
6
Cf. Marshall & Potter, supra note 3, at 8 (“[M]ore than any other series, The Wire works to
confound the line between truth and fiction.”).
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By bringing a depiction of that reality to millions of viewers, the show
spreads the knowledge its creators gained.
That knowledge entitles the creators to be taken seriously when
they propose a solution to the grievous problems they portray. Let us
now turn to their proposal.
B.

Hamsterdam

The Wire is about Baltimore’s drug dealers, its drug buyers, and
the police who try to stop the drug trade. Among the many real-life tragedies portrayed in the series, perhaps the most horrifying is the violence.
This violence primarily involves the efforts of drug gangs to keep
or acquire turf for drug sales by menacing or killing members of rival
gangs. But it also involves the police, who use excessive and unnecessary force in many interactions with the young men they encounter on
the streets.
In Season Three, one character contemplates how to stem that violence.7 Bunny Colvin is the police officer in charge of Baltimore’s Western District, and as he nears retirement, he decides to try an experiment aimed at solving one of the core problems of the war on drugs.
Specifically, the drug trade ruins neighborhoods by bringing its violence
and addiction there. The police cannot solve this problem by simple arrests because the problem is too large, the criminals’ evasion techniques
are too sophisticated, and there is too strong an incentive for the crime
to continue.
So Colvin hatches a plan to drag the drug trade away from population centers and into a place where it will go unnoticed by those who
want no part of it. In addition, he supplies that place with protection so
that the violence is reduced.
Colvin creates three “free zones” where his police officers will be
instructed not to arrest anyone for buying or selling drugs. The zones
are in “abandoned areas of the Western District—‘away from the residential streets, away from commercial areas, away from schools.’”8 Colvin informs the mid-level drug dealers that if they confine their sales to

7

As cited in prior footnotes, Lance McMillian has written an excellent account of Hamsterdam in a law review article. McMillian, supra note 3. He explains the plotline in far more detail
than I do, and I recommend his work to interested readers. The difference between his article and
mine is that he discusses whether Hamsterdam could work in real life by considering the theory
behind the drug trade, whereas I discuss it by comparing Hamsterdam to real-world efforts to
legalize, decriminalize, and depenalize drugs. Perhaps for that reason, we reach different conclusions: He is far more optimistic than I am about how well something like Hamsterdam would work
in real life.
8
McMillian, supra note 3, at 858–59 (quoting The Wire: Dead Soldiers (HBO television broadcast Oct. 3, 2004) (Season Three, Episode Three)).
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these free zones, then the police will leave them alone. But if they continue to sell outside the zones, then the police will brutalize them.9
After some initial suspicion and unwillingness, the drug dealers
comply. The free zones become known on the streets as “Hamsterdam,”
an inaccurate reference to the Dutch city of Amsterdam, where marijuana is famously sold in coffee shops without police interference.
Colvin’s idea works. Once the drug trade moves away from residential and commercial neighborhoods, life in those neighborhoods becomes
safer and more vibrant. This is possible because Hamsterdam represents a windfall for the drug dealers, whose costs decrease: They no
longer lose merchandise to drug busts, and they no longer need to kill
rivals or to worry about being killed by them in an endless effort to gain
and retain turf for drug sales.
This success is reflected in the police statistics on crime, which improve markedly.10 Buoyed by the progress, Colvin expands his ambitions by bringing health-care workers into Hamsterdam. As one of those
workers says,
From a public health perspective, there are amazing things happening in the free zones: needle exchanges, blood tests, condom
distribution. Most of all, we’re interacting with an adverse community that is largely elusive. We’re even talking some of these
people into drug treatment.11
But The Wire does not depict Colvin’s solution as a panacea. There
is tremendous sorrow and hopelessness in Hamsterdam, and we even
see drug-induced death. Hamsterdam is described as “hell.”12
Even so, we are left with the impression that Hamsterdam has improved life in Baltimore on the whole, perhaps by a large amount. After
seeing the ravages of the drug trade and the drug war on communities,
we now see those communities benefiting from the absence of that trade
and that war.13 In images that are jarring in how much they differ from
the show’s typical depiction of drug-ravaged neighborhoods, we see the
9

The Wire: Straight and True (HBO television broadcast Oct. 17, 2004) (Season Three, Episode Five) (“I have over 200 sworn personnel and I will free them all up to brutalize every one of
you they can. If you’re on a corner in my district, it . . . will be some Biblical shit that happens to
you on the way into that jail wagon. You understand? We will not be playing by any rules that you
recognize.”); McMillian, supra note 3, at 859 n.32.
10
The Wire: Moral Midgetry (HBO television broadcast Nov. 14, 2004) (Season Three, Episode
Eight); McMillian, supra note 3, at 861.
11
The Wire: Middle Ground (HBO television broadcast Dec. 12, 2004) (Season Three, Episode
Eleven); McMillian, supra note 3, at 861 n.40.
12
The Wire: Moral Midgetry, supra note 10 (Season Three, Episode Eight); McMillian, supra
note 3, at 862.
13
The Wire: Homecoming, (HBO television broadcast Oct. 31, 2004) (Season Three, Episode
Six).
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newly drug-free communities filled with people of all ages pleasantly
walking down safe streets, gardening, dribbling basketballs, hanging
clothes out to dry, selling lemonade, and generally enjoying their lives
free of fear.14
Unfortunately, the improved crime statistics catch the eye of the
deputy police commissioner, who learns about Hamsterdam. Eventually, a politician learns of it too and exploits it for political gain, creating
a hailstorm of public outrage about unauthorized drug legalization. Under overwhelming pressure, the mayor calls for an end to Hamsterdam,
and this end is effected via mass arrests and ultimately demolition.15
It is clear that the lesson we are meant to take from this is that
Hamsterdam was a good thing that failed because of certain individuals’ narrow self-interest and many people’s ideological small-mindedness and resistance to creative, pragmatic solutions. The Wire presents
the idea that if only society were willing to tolerate a Hamsterdam-style
depenalization scheme, the benefits would greatly exceed the costs (if
indeed there were any costs relative to the status quo).16
II. DRUG LEGALIZATION, DEPENALIZATION, AND DECRIMINALIZATION
EFFORTS IN REAL LIFE
Would Hamsterdam work in real life? In my view, the best way to
make an informed guess is to consider the similar (to one degree or another) experiments that have actually been tried by law enforcement in
various countries.
Let me note at the outset that some people, on both sides of the
policy debate, view the drug issue as a moral one. On one side, some
consider drug use to be inherently wrong and believe it should not be
tolerated regardless of the costs of such prohibition. Others believe, oppositely, that drug use is a choice that people should be free to make,
regardless of the costs (primarily to themselves, but also indirectly to
others) of allowing them to make it. My focus here is not on either of
these sorts of views, but rather on the question of what policy would be
best for overall well-being. (This might be thought of as a utilitarian,
rather than deontic, approach.) Whatever moral beliefs they may have,
I suspect that many people would consider it desirable to reduce drug-

14

Id.
The Wire: Mission Accomplished (HBO television broadcast Dec. 19, 2004) (Season Three,
Episode Twelve); McMillian, supra note 3, at 863–64.
16
Although Hamsterdam is described as hell, Colvin says that this is not really a harm because the drug users there “ain’t no worse off than they were when they were scattered all over
the map. Now they’re just in one place, that’s all.” The Wire: Moral Midgetry, supra note 10 (Season
Three, Episode Eight); McMillian, supra note 3, at 862.
15
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related violence and the sort of addiction that typically ruins the lives
of the individual and others around her or him.
Now let us turn to a point about terminology, so as to differentiate
various types of approaches to drug policy.17 The “war on drugs” in the
United States embodies somewhat of a zero-tolerance policy, at least
with respect to the “hardest” drugs, such as heroin. Such drugs are
criminalized, and the criminal laws are enforced vigorously with the
primary goals of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation.
An alternative is to view drugs as a public health problem rather
than as a crime problem. But doing so can take many different forms.
At the extreme, a nation could simply legalize drugs such as heroin,
cocaine, and marijuana, and then treat them the way the United States
currently treats alcohol and tobacco. In that case, people could legally
buy heroin at a store and use it without breaking any law. Such an approach may be labeled “legalization.”18
Legalization would probably have meaningful benefits, such as
eliminating much of the violence perpetrated by drug gangs to defend
their turf. There are no comparable gangs for alcohol or tobacco because
those are sold legally in stores, just as drugs would be in a legalization
framework. However, legalization might dramatically increase the use
of drugs like heroin and cocaine. Due to this concern, policy options have
emerged that fall somewhere between legalization and zero-tolerance
criminalization.
Hamsterdam is one such example. Although the sale and use of
drugs were still crimes on the books, actors in the penal system did not
enforce those laws. As a result, there was crime without punishment.
The term for this is “depenalization.”19
Yet another option is to retain the legislative prohibition on drug
use, and to enforce that prohibition, but to make the prohibition noncriminal in nature. Portugal has done this, as described in Part II of
this Article. This is called “decriminalization.”20
By considering how each of these practices has worked, we can get
a sense of their relative strengths and weaknesses and thereby assess

17

As described below, I will be using the terms “legalization,” “decriminalization,” and “depenalization” as those terms are defined in Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes & Alex Stevens, What Can
We Learn from the Portuguese Decriminalization of Illicit Drugs?, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 999,
999 (2010).
18
Id. (defining legalization as “the complete removal of sanctions, making a certain behaviour
legal and applying no criminal or administrative penalty”). Note that the approach in Amsterdam,
described below, fits this definition in the sense that it involves “the complete removal of sanctions.” As will be explained, it constitutes “de facto legalization” even though there is still a national statute criminalizing drug use there.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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whether Hamsterdam or some alternative holds the most promise here
in the United States.
A.

De Facto Legalization in the Netherlands: Amsterdam vs. Hamsterdam

Perhaps the world’s most famous example of a drug-policy alternative to zero-tolerance criminalization is the sale of marijuana in coffee
shops in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Indeed, so famous is that policy
that the fictional drug dealers on the streets of Baltimore in The Wire
tried (albeit imperfectly) to name Bunny Colvin’s scheme after that
Dutch city.
Hamsterdam may trace its roots to Amsterdam, but how did Amsterdam’s lenient drug policy come about? It began with the enactment
of a national statute in the Netherlands called the revised Opium Act
of 1976.21 This 1976 revision of the Act differentiated between heroin
and cocaine on the one hand (both of which it deemed “unacceptable
risks”), and cannabis on the other hand (which it deemed an “acceptable
risk[]”).22 Under the 1976 statute, selling or possessing cannabis was
still a crime, but the maximum penalty for an amount of thirty grams
or less was only one month in jail.23 The thirty-gram threshold was
meant to “‘allow a personal supply sufficient for two weeks that would
also enable users to share some stuff with their friends.’”24
This is strange on its face. If the Dutch government considered
small quantities of marijuana to be an “acceptable risk,” and if it
wanted to allow a personal supply, then why did it write a law criminalizing possession of those small quantities of marijuana? The answer
may be that the Netherlands had signed an international treaty in 1961
compelling it to criminalize such drug possession.25 Faced with that obstacle, but still wanting to allow the sale of marijuana for personal use,
21

See Marianne van Ooyen-Houben & Edward Kleemans, Drug Policy: The “Dutch Model”, 44
CRIME & JUST. 165, 166 (2015).
22
ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES 245 (2001).
23
Id.
24
Ed Leuw, Initial Construction and Development of the Official Dutch Drug Policy, in
BETWEEN PROHIBITION AND LEGALIZATION: THE DUTCH EXPERIMENT IN DRUG POLICY 23, 36 (Ed
Leuw & I. Haen Marshall eds., 1994); MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 22, at 245.
25
Arising out of “an effort to replace all existing treaties with a single one,” that treaty (the
United Nations’ Single Convention of New York) “is still the primary legal document in the international cooperative effort against the so-called dangerous drugs.” Jos Silvis, Enforcing Drug Laws
in the Netherlands, in BETWEEN PROHIBITION AND LEGALIZATION: THE DUTCH EXPERIMENT IN
DRUG POLICY 41, 42 (Ed Leuw & I. Haen Marshall eds., 1994); see also Tom Blom & Hans van
Mastrigt, The Future of the Dutch Model in the Context of the War on Drugs, in BETWEEN
PROHIBITION AND LEGALIZATION: THE DUTCH EXPERIMENT IN DRUG POLICY 255, 255 (Ed Leuw &
I. Haen Marshall eds., 1994); MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 22, at 243–44. The possibility that
this treaty influenced the drafting of the Netherlands’ 1976 domestic statute is pointed out by
Silvis, supra, at 48 (noting that the treaty “demand[s] criminalization of possession . . . of soft
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the Netherlands capitalized on its system of criminal law enforcement.
That system uses formal guidelines to interpret how (and even whether)
to enforce the statutory prohibitions on behavior:
[T]he Dutch have committed themselves to the principle of expediency (or opportunity) which formally allows discretionary powers to the police and the prosecution. The use of this principle of
expediency is not limited to the necessity of setting priorities in
order to cope with scarcity of resources. In fact the main function
of the principle of expediency is to prevent prosecutions that are
not in the best public interest.26
Thus, the Dutch supplemented their 1976 statute with formal
guidelines instructing the police not to arrest people for buying, selling,
using, or possessing less than thirty grams of marijuana, and in particular to allow such transactions in coffee shops.27
This may seem similar to Hamsterdam—only with respect to marijuana, of course28—but it is in fact very different. The apparent similarity is that in both cases, the statutory law criminalizes drug sales,
but the police choose to allow those sales nonetheless. Such non-enforcement is typically labeled depenalization, and that is indeed what Hamsterdam exemplified. But the crucial difference in the Netherlands is
that the police’s non-enforcement was formalized in “officially published
guidelines on how to deal with certain cases under specified conditions.”29 This enabled the Dutch to claim (based on their statute) that
they were technically complying with the 1961 treaty, while actually
treating the sale and use of marijuana the same way that it would be
treated if it were legal.
Hamsterdam ended when people learned about it, but everyone
knows about Amsterdam, and its policies remain.30 And the differences
do not end there. Even while Hamsterdam existed, its drug transactions
took place under a cloud of uncertainty because the police who permitted those transactions were acting without official, public authorization
of the legal system. By contrast, the formal Dutch guidelines provided
such authorization, and the way they were followed made it clear to
everyone that the coffee shop sales were allowed. Even the 1976 statute
drugs”); see also MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 22, at 246–47.
26
Silvis, supra note 25, at 44 (emphasis added).
27
MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 22, at 246–47.
28
Hamsterdam depenalized all drugs, whereas Amsterdam differentiates between soft drugs
like marijuana and hard drugs like cocaine and heroin.
29
Silvis, supra note 25, at 44.
30
Even Amsterdam has somewhat scaled back its tolerant approach in recent years. See van
Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, supra note 21, at 167–73. However, it has not reversed that tolerant
approach entirely, id. at 173, or eliminated the coffee shops, id. at 168 Tbl. 2.
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that says such sales are crimes is accurately understood to have been
written for the purpose of letting the sales happen rather than stopping
them.
For these reasons, scholars have labeled Amsterdam’s approach “de
facto legalization,”31 which contrasts with Hamsterdam’s depenalization. The label of legalization makes sense, even though such a label
would seem to be ruled out automatically by the fact that there is a
statute on the books saying that the behavior is a crime. The best way
to think of this is perhaps that in the Dutch legal system, statutory
criminality is not sufficient to make something meaningfully illegal.
In any event, what matters for our purposes is whether Amsterdam
has been a policy success. In particular, has the number of drug users
increased there? That issue—more users—is the signature concern with
legalization. Since legalization solves many of the problems faced by
drug policy,32 the main reluctance to legalize drugs is the fear that doing
so will bring drugs into the lives of many more people. After all, one of
the core purposes of the criminal law is deterrence, so it is intuitive that
eliminating criminal sanctions and allowing drugs to be sold in coffee
shops would undo that deterrence.
It is not easy to interpret the evidence on how Amsterdam’s coffee
shops affected the number of drug users there. As a result, contradictory claims have been made.33 But a very careful analysis has been performed by Robert MacCoun and Peter Reuter.34 They make a convincing
case that the 1976 depenalization “had little effect if any on levels of
use during the first 7 years of the new regime,”35 but that in the 1980s
the “progression from depenalization to de facto legalization” (as the
formal guidelines took hold and everyone learned that buying marijuana really was legal in the coffee shops) correlated with “consistent[]
and sharp[]” increases in the number of marijuana users.36 For example, there is survey evidence that the percentage of 18–20 year-olds who
had used marijuana increased “from 15 percent in 1984 to 44 percent in
1996.”37

31

MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 22, at 246.
See, e.g., M. Grapendaal et al., Legalization, Decriminalization and the Reduction of Crime,
in BETWEEN PROHIBITION AND LEGALIZATION: THE DUTCH EXPERIMENT IN DRUG POLICY 233, 233–
34 (Ed Leuw & I. Haen Marshall eds., 1994).
33
E.g., MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 22, at 246 (quoting accounts that say, respectively,
that the Dutch policy is responsible for more and less drug use than exists with stricter policies).
34
Indeed, MacCoun and Reuter’s book Drug War Heresies has been called “[t]he most comprehensive synthetic review of the impacts of the decriminalization of illicit drugs.” Hughes & Stevens, supra note 17, at 1000.
35
MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 22, at 256.
36
Id. at 257.
37
Id.
32
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To a degree, those numbers may be misleading because other countries experienced “similar large increases” in usage rates to those in the
Netherlands from 1992 to 1996.38 However, during the period from 1984
to 1992, the rise in usage rates among Dutch youth was almost unique
among countries whose rates have been studied. Whereas rates were
“flat or declining . . . during this period in Catalunya, Stockholm, Hamburg, . . . Denmark . . . , Germany as a whole, . . . Canada . . . , and Australia,” they were increasing in the Netherlands.39 This left the Netherlands with rates of marijuana use that were “somewhat higher than
those of many of its neighbors” (albeit still “somewhat lower than those
in the United States”).40 Amsterdam has higher rates than elsewhere
in the Netherlands—rates similar to those in the U.S.41
So the 1976 statute itself did not immediately result in more people
using marijuana, but after seven years, the policy of de facto legalization via the guidelines had “‘found concrete expression in the form of
coffee shops’”42 and had led to “the heightened salience and glamorization (in the youth-cultural sense) that results from widespread, highly
visible promotion—in shop signs and advertisements but also in countercultural media ads, postcards, and posters.”43 This, in turn, caused a
large spike in the number of users.44
What can we learn from Amsterdam? It seems that when a drug
can be bought and sold in coffee shops—that is, bought and sold legally
for all intents and purposes—many more people (especially young
adults) will try using the drug. That is a crucial lesson because it complicates matters for those who make drug policy, especially policy regarding “hard” drugs such as heroin and cocaine.45 Legalization cures
many ills, so it would be a promising approach if it did not increase the

38

Id. at 258; see also ANGELA BOAK ET AL., DRUG USE AMONG ONTARIO STUDENTS, 1977–2017,
50 (2017), http://www.camh.ca/en/research/news_and_publications/ontario-student-drug-use-andhealth-survey/Documents/2017 OSDUHS Documents/Detailed_DrugUseReport_2017OSDUHS
.pdf [https://perma.cc/M962-B9YL].
39
MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 22, at 258.
40
Id. at 256.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 260 (quoting DIRK J. KORF, DUTCH TREAT: FORMAL CONTROL AND ILLICIT DRUG USE
IN THE NETHERLANDS (1995)).
43
Id.; see also id. at 303, 339 (“[T]here was . . . a sharp and sustained increase in marijuana
prevalence from 1984 to 1992, plausibly attributable to increased access and promotion through
the coffeeshops.”).
44
A note of caution is warranted. Although the overwhelming weight of the evidence does
seem to point in the direction of a causal link between Dutch de facto legalization and increased
marijuana use in the Netherlands, one can never be certain in drawing causal inferences from
data. Indeed, if one wanted to argue against such an inference here, one could point to the fact
that increases in drug use in other countries “have occurred . . . despite very different policies.” Id.
at 263.
45
See id. at 304.
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number of drug users. (It might be promising anyway, but only if such
an increase were the lesser of the evils.46) Since it does appear to increase the number of users, however, we may want to seek alternatives
in the hope of reaping some of legalization’s rewards without its costs.
The most obvious alternative is Hamsterdam. One could very easily
draw the following lesson from the experience of the Netherlands: Depenalization created benefits without major costs, but such costs
(namely, increased usage rates) arrived when depenalization turned
into de facto legalization. Specifically, when the Netherlands began its
depenalization policy in 1976—and before that policy led to widespread
famous selling of marijuana in coffee shops—it “significantly reduced
the monetary and human costs of incarcerating cannabis offenders with
no apparent effect on levels of use.”47
Hamsterdam aims to achieve those same results via depenalization
without de facto legalization. In Hamsterdam, there were no coffee
shops, and there was no commercialization in any respect. Although
buyers were not arrested there, the sense of express societal approval
remained absent. In The Wire, this approach seemed optimal for achieving benefits without making it likely that usage would spike. Is Hamsterdam, then, the best answer? That is the question to which we now
turn.
B.

Depenalization in Switzerland: The Real-Life Hamsterdam

Perhaps surprisingly, we need not consider Hamsterdam solely in
theory because an almost identical experiment was tried in real life—
in Zurich, Switzerland in the late 1980s. Like the city of Baltimore that
is depicted (realistically) in The Wire, Zurich was a place with very strict
drug enforcement.48 And as in The Wire, the harms from that strict approach led local officials to carve out an exception within their jurisdiction.
One relevant difference between Zurich and Baltimore was that the
former was “a city lacking slums,”49 which made it a challenge to find a
place to put the depenalization zone. Local officials chose a park named
the Platzspitz “behind the main train station in Zurich.”50 This location
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was crucially different from Hamsterdam in that it was very close to
upscale neighborhoods and easily accessible due to its proximity to the
train hub.51 However, like Hamsterdam, the Platzspitz was not visible
to the rest of the city: What it lacked in distance it made up for in sheer
physical separation, as it was surrounded by water on three sides and
a high wall on the fourth.52 In this way, it could remain just as hidden
from view as was Hamsterdam.
Apart from its proximity to the train station and to the rest of the
upscale, slumless city abutting it, perhaps the only important difference
between the Platzspitz and Hamsterdam was that the former was created by the Zurich city council rather than by one ingenious police officer. But that fact did not change the experiment’s nature from a Hamsterdam-style depenalization to an Amsterdam-style de facto
legalization. Like Hamsterdam and unlike Amsterdam, the Platzspitz
was no coffee shop. It was “a Hieronymous Bosch vision of a drug hell.”53
(Picturing that description, one cannot help but be reminded of Hamsterdam, which looked just like that and indeed was itself pointedly described as “hell.”54 I do not know whether David Simon, the creator of
The Wire, knew of the Platzspitz when he invented Hamsterdam.) And
the fate of the Platzspitz, which we will come to in a moment, underscores its similarity to Hamsterdam’s depenalization approach and its
difference from Amsterdam’s de facto legalization approach in that the
latter derived stability and public acceptance from its essentially legal
status.
The goal of a project like Hamsterdam or the Platzspitz is to get the
benefits of legalization without the costs. And The Wire takes the position that this positive outcome is realistic, at least absent political blowback. In The Wire, Hamsterdam succeeds at dragging the ugliness of
the drug war away from residential and commercial neighborhoods, reducing the incentives for violence, and providing users with health services. And it does not appear to increase the number of drug users, at
least by any large amount, because it flies under the radar and is distinctly unappealing.
The results from the Platzspitz are uncertain, but they seem more
mixed than the results of Hamsterdam. For one thing, the Platzspitz
never flew under the radar. Dubbed “Needle Park,” it “became internationally famous because of mass-media reporting.”55 (The same would
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now probably be true of Hamsterdam, even faster than it was on the
show, in this age of smartphones and the resulting rapid transfer of
information via photos and social media.) And as a result of that fame,
along with its proximity to the main train station of a major city, thousands flocked there.56 As economists predict in cases of legalization,57
the Platzspitz caused the price of cocaine and heroin to plummet,58
which may have increased demand for those drugs.
There were crime problems as well:
The number of robberies and muggings almost doubled in the
downtown areas around the Platzspitz as the population of addicts in the park expanded. . . . There had been a small number
of gruesome homicides, apparently the result of battles between
rival drug-dealing gangs, mostly from Eastern Europe and the
Mideast.59
Due to these problems, and especially the negative press coverage,
the Zurich city government closed the park in early 1992, about five
years after it opened.60
It would be easy to conclude from this information that the
Platzspitz was a failure. It ended quickly and ignominiously due to public outrage, just like Hamsterdam. And unlike Hamsterdam, it seems
to have brought crime and violence to its surrounding neighborhoods.
Also unlike Hamsterdam, it may well have increased drug use, in part
by attracting worldwide attention. By this accounting, it would seem to
have done exactly the opposite of what the Zurich authorities intended.
Rather than keep the advantages of Amsterdam’s legalization approach
while reducing the harm (i.e., wider drug use) of that approach, the
Platzspitz seemed not to achieve the advantages that The Wire and others attribute to legalization or depenalization (e.g., reduced crime and
violence) while retaining the harm of those policies by attracting drug
users via lower prices and shelter from arrest. In trying to be the best
of both worlds, it was arguably the worst of both. And even if it had,
despite appearances, improved people’s lives on the whole, it still could
not be counted a success because, like Hamsterdam, it was terminated
by virtue of being a public relations disaster. So the simple verdict
would be that the Platzspitz was a failure.
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The truth, however, is probably more complicated. For one thing,
the Platzspitz shared Hamsterdam’s advantage of bringing public
health officials to the place where the drug users now had to congregate.
Although it is hard to measure all the benefits of that fact given the
available data, such benefits were likely considerable. Indeed, one crucial measure of its success is that the rates of HIV fell.61 And for another
thing, knowing that thousands of people bought drugs at the Platzspitz
does not tell us whether drug use increased. It may be that the
Platzspitz, like Hamsterdam, simply became the destination of choice
for people who previously bought their drugs elsewhere. Similarly, the
drug-related crime around the Platzspitz—which crime was not in residential neighborhoods but rather in “the underground shopping area
adjacent to the train station”—may well have been displaced from alternative areas where it would otherwise have occurred.62 Indeed, given
the low rates of crime in the Platzspitz, we cannot rule out the possibility that its existence actually decreased crime on the whole,63 just like
Hamsterdam’s existence did. In fact, perhaps the greatest testament to
the Platzspitz’s value was that when it closed, the resulting spread of
drug-related problems meant that “the city was forced to allow a new
zone of tolerance (never formalized) to operate in another, smaller area
with few residents nearby.”64
We may never be able to say with any confidence whether the
Platzspitz was a failure (as is widely believed), a success (as seems possible), or something in between. Something in between seems most
likely. Although it helped bring health officials together with drug users
and probably reduced the spread of AIDS, it also does not seem to have
reduced crime (and may have increased it) while very possibly increasing the number of drug users. At a minimum, it does not seem to have
had the rousing success that Hamsterdam is depicted as having had
before its demise.
If that is true, then we might draw the inference that The Wire was
perhaps too optimistic about the prospects for something like Hamsterdam to achieve the benefits that the show attributed to it. Instead of
improving on Amsterdam, Zurich’s real-life Hamsterdam may well have
been worse. If nothing else, we can be certain of one thing: It did not
last.
We will need to look elsewhere, then, for an answer to the question
of what might be the most promising avenue for a lasting improvement
upon the tragic status quo that The Wire depicts.
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Decriminalization in Portugal: A More Lasting Success?

Using drugs is not a crime in Portugal. It is not a crime there to use
marijuana, or to use cocaine, or to use heroin. Whereas Amsterdam’s
coffee shops are a famous symbol of liberal drug policy, they sell only
marijuana. And as we have seen, even Amsterdam operates under a
national statute criminalizing marijuana, and only the police guidelines
there make marijuana use de facto legal. In Portugal, by contrast, a
national statute says that the use of any drug is not criminal behavior.
As stunning as Portugal’s drug policy may seem, it is equally confusing. For although using drugs is not a crime, it is nonetheless far
from legal: It is an administrative offense for which one can receive a
citation and face consequences. And those consequences are not a mere
theoretical possibility: Portugal enforces its drug laws energetically.
This is a peculiar approach. One often thinks of a country as being
either tough on drugs, like the United States and the United Kingdom
are with respect to heroin, or else relatively soft like the Netherlands.
Portugal’s system seems to stem from neither overarching philosophy.
Despite that, or perhaps because of it, Portugal’s system has had
substantial success. Let us first discuss what exactly the law and policy
are, and then consider their effects.
1.

Portuguese drug law and policy

Before 2001, Portugal criminalized drug use, with the maximum
penalty being one year in prison.65 Drug use was low there, but intravenous heroin use led to a large increase in the spread of several diseases including HIV/AIDS.66 In response, the Portuguese government
commissioned a study of how to improve its drug policy to address this
problem.67 The study, whose recommendations were adopted, recommended a bold new approach intended to “channel[] minor drug offenders into the drug treatment system.”68
The first step in that strategy was to decriminalize drug use via a
national statute, Law 30/2000.69 The possession of small amounts of
heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and other drugs would be an administrative
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offense handled by Commissions for the Dissuasion of Drug Addiction
(CDTs).70
Here is how it works. If you use drugs and get caught, the police
confiscate the drugs and issue a citation requiring you to appear within
seventy-two hours before a CDT.71 The CDT is a panel of three people
who may well be lawyers, doctors, or social workers.72 That panel then
tries to learn whether you are addicted to drugs. If so, it will probably
recommend you receive treatment instead of sanctions. If not, it may
impose community service or a fine. The panel’s purpose is to reduce
drug use, so non-addicts receive disincentives and addicts receive
help.73
2.

Does it work?

Portugal enacted its reforms in response to an epidemic of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS that were being spread by the use of
heroin and other injectable drugs. The reforms were a huge success in
addressing that problem: “[B]etween 2000 and 2008, the number of
cases of HIV reduced among drug users from 907 to 267 and the number
of cases of AIDS reduced from 506 to 108.”74
Along the same lines, “[t]he proportion of deaths in which opiates
were the main substance in Portugal has continued on an almost steady
decline” from 1999 to 2008.75 Overall, many fewer people in Portugal
died from drugs in the years immediately following the 2001 reforms
than in the years immediately preceding them.76
Perhaps the most intensely disputed effect is on the number of drug
users. Opponents of lenient drug policies claim such policies will increase drug use (as has occurred in Amsterdam), whereas proponents
of such policies know their goals will be advanced by claiming that the
policies do not increase drug use. The most careful and reputable source
addressing these issues gives the following conclusions.77 It appears
that overall rates of drug use increased in Portugal after the 2001 decriminalization.78 However, such rates also increased a similar amount
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in Spain and Italy during the same period, suggesting that the increase
in Portugal may well not have been caused by the decriminalization.
Moreover, Portugal experienced a decline in its number of problematic
drug users,79 whereas Italy and Spain did not.80
Portugal did not decriminalize the sale of drugs, nor did it legalize
or even depenalize possession, so its reforms would not be expected to
have diminished drug-related crime (other than to eliminate drug possession itself as a crime). And indeed, although Portuguese crime statistics are far from definitive,81 the best guess seems to be that crime
was unaffected by the decriminalization.82
The changes in Portugal since the decriminalization—not all of
which (in particular, the first listed item below) are likely caused by it—
have been summarized as follows:
• small increases in reported illicit drug use among adults;
• reduced illicit drug use among problematic drug users and adolescents, at least since 2003;
• reduced burden of drug offenders on the criminal justice system;
• increased uptake of drug treatment;
• reduction in opiate-related deaths and infectious diseases;
• increases in the amounts of drugs seized by the authorities;
• reductions in the retail prices of drugs.83
All in all, it seems clear that the Portuguese decriminalization
achieved its desired goals and dramatically improved upon the conditions before the decriminalization was enacted. It has been a lasting
success as judged by what it was intended to achieve, namely a reduction in the spread of infectious diseases and a reduction in problematic
drug use.
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D. Lessons from the Real World
In The Wire, Hamsterdam’s depenalization approach reduced crime
and drug-related violence, improved neighborhoods, connected drug users with public health officials, and did not seem to significantly increase drug use. Its one real failing was that it could not survive political backlash and therefore did not last.
The fate of the Platzspitz in Zurich—the real-life Hamsterdam—
suggests that such a depiction may have been inaccurately rosy. The
Platzspitz did have some similarities (good and bad) with Hamsterdam:
It brought public health officials into contact with drug users, but it
failed to survive for long due to political backlash. The difference is that
Switzerland’s real-life version of Hamsterdam does not seem to have
had the fictional city’s large positive effect on crime and also may well
have increased drug use. We cannot be confident in those negative assessments: As discussed above, the data is far from conclusive. Nevertheless, at a minimum there is no evidence that the Platzspitz reduced
crime, and there is strong evidence that it increased crime nearby. It
was widely viewed as a failure, and even if that conclusion was wrong,
it still does not seem that it deserves to be viewed as having achieved
anything like the success that Hamsterdam is depicted as achieving. As
a result, our best guess should be that The Wire may well be wrong to
suggest that Hamsterdam would have achieved such good results.
When it was tried in real life, it did not have them.
So if Hamsterdam is not the best solution to the problem of drug
policy, what is? To truly reduce the drug-related violence that is realistically depicted on The Wire, legalization almost certainly has to be the
best answer. Turf wars are eliminated (or at least greatly reduced)
when a product can be bought cheaply in stores, like alcohol and tobacco
in the U.S. and marijuana in Amsterdam. And perhaps legalization
would be the best solution. But the experience in Amsterdam with marijuana legalization has involved a large spike in the number of marijuana users. To legalize all drugs, and risk such a spike in the number of
cocaine and heroin users, would be politically toxic and, even as a policy
matter, worthy of caution and concern.
The question is whether a nation can achieve at least some of the
benefits of legalization without the cost of increased drug use. And it
seems that the answer is yes, as judged by Portugal’s success with decriminalization. Before explaining why, though, let me acknowledge
several crucial caveats: (i) decriminalization is no panacea; (ii) Portugal’s success, which itself is somewhat limited, is principally owed to
measures other than mere statutory decriminalization; and (iii) more
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extreme measures such as legalization could possibly be better for reducing harm on the whole even if they have the negative effect of increasing the number of drug users.
Decriminalization is no panacea because, unlike legalization, it
continues to criminalize the sale of drugs and also asks the police to stop
and cite people for the non-criminal (but still administratively illegal)
possession of drugs. As a result, there is still the same incentive for
black markets to exist, and those black markets may involve violence.
So Portuguese-style decriminalization would not be expected to solve
the main problems depicted on The Wire. Moreover, even the success
Portugal has achieved is mostly due not to the decriminalization itself
but to the nation’s commitment to drug treatment and other public
health programs as part of its comprehensive plan in 2001. To be sure,
decriminalization was an essential element of that plan; but it alone
would not have done much. Finally, given the limited ambitions of decriminalization, we certainly cannot rule out the possibility that a more
ambitious legalization approach would be better on the whole, even if it
had negatives (such as increased drug use) that would have to be
weighed against its positives (such as decreased drug-related violence).
Having said all that, Portugal remains a success story. In a world
where tough drug policies do not seem to have been successful at reducing drug use or addressing the problems that spring from black markets—and in a world where lenient drug policies are often harshly condemned in ideological terms—Portugal has managed to maintain a
relatively lenient policy and has reaped its intended benefits without
many apparent harms.
Portugal’s drug policy may seem to be much grander than that of
Hamsterdam. It involved a national statute and a vast national action
plan, whereas Hamsterdam was implemented by one police officer in
one neighborhood of one city. Portugal made drug use a non-crime,
whereas Hamsterdam just involved some police officers looking the
other way while that crime was committed. And it is true that Portugal’s large-scale approach, originating from and being thoroughly supported by elected officials at the highest level, accounts in part for the
fact that the program has lasted.
Still, Portugal’s approach is also, in crucial ways, much less ambitious than Hamsterdam’s. Unlike Hamsterdam, Portugal aggressively
enforces its criminal prohibition against drug sales. And unlike in Hamsterdam, Portuguese police cite people for (the administrative offense
of) drug possession. For these reasons, Portugal was never even trying
to achieve the sweeping successes that Bunny Colvin briefly achieved.
Portugal has not solved the problem of drugs, or even come remotely
close to doing so. It has merely improved upon the status quo, but given
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how difficult drug policy has proven to be throughout the world, even
such an improvement is a model of success.
CONCLUSION
The Wire is rightly famous for its realism. Not only is it based on
real knowledge of the streets of Baltimore, but also it is willing (even
eager) to depict shades of gray and the nuances of human life. But even
The Wire is not perfect, and it is possible that its answer to the question
of “what should be done?” is insufficiently subtle.
As presented by that TV show, the status quo is broken and irredeemable. What would be better, The Wire says, is a scheme of depenalization in the mold of Hamsterdam. Such a scheme would have great
success, we are asked to believe, were it not impossible due solely to
tragic political impediments.
In reality, the truth may be neither as hopeful as The Wire’s view
of Hamsterdam nor as bleak as its view of the political realities that
destroyed Hamsterdam. On the downside, we may not be able to achieve
the benefits of legalization—decreased violence, to start with—without
incurring increased drug use, as Amsterdam shows. Hamsterdam’s version of depenalization might even produce that harm without legalization’s benefits. But more hopefully, Portuguese-style decriminalization
could achieve some meaningful benefits without increases in problematic drug use. That would be a major improvement upon the status quo.
Still, it would require not only a great deal of political will (which might
not be possible in the United States), but also the willingness to set our
sights somewhat lower than Bunny Colvin did with Hamsterdam. Decriminalization (plus a major commitment to treatment and other public health measures, as in Portugal) would not solve all the problems
with the drug trade, or perhaps even the biggest ones, but it might be
the best we can do.

